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CASENOTES

Mobile v. Bolden: New Standards of
Review for Effective Political
Representation
The landmark Supreme Court decision in Reynolds v. Sims'

held that "achieving . . . fair and effective representation for all
citizens is . . . the basic aim of legislative apportionment." 2 Com-

pared with "one person-one vote" apportionment this qualitative
guarantee presents different and more subtle problems in creating
standards for review.3 The determination of what is fair and effective representation in the political process brings the Court to the
verge of transgressing the line separating the judicial and legislative functions in our system of government."
1. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2. Id. at 565-66.
3. The mathematical equality rule requires legislative districts to be drawn
"as nearly of equal population as is practicable," so that one man's vote in a congressional election is worth as much as another's. Id. at 577. Under this rule, effective representation results when representatives are allocated in direct proportion to a district's population. The qualitative guarantee, however, addresses the
actual voting strength of a definable population group. It may be minimized even
though the subgroup resides in a district having proportional representation in
compliance with the mathematical equality rule. Ultimately, assessment of the
quality of voting strength delves into areas of political philosophy because the
voting strength of any group can be affected by the type of representational form
of government in operation. For a concise discussion on the rights of political
participation see TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 737-61 (1978) (hereinafter cited as TRIBE).

4. Justice Frankfurter addressed this issue in his dissent in the historic decision of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), where the majority had found legislative malapportionment to be justiciable under the fourteenth amendment. He
found that in apportionment cases the parties vote, their votes are counted, and
their chosen representatives go to the legislature. But, "their complaint is simply
One canthat the representatives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful ....
not speak of . . . 'dilution' of the value of a vote until there is first defined a

standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth." Id. at 300. Justice
Frankfurter further stated that asking the Court to articulate such a standard is
actually asking the Court "to choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy-in or-

der to establish an appropriate frame of government . . . for all States of the
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One significant area in which this qualitative dimension has
received judicial attention is apportionment plans employing
multi-member districts.5 At the time of the Reynolds decision the
Court acknowledged that those districts may have certain undesirable characteristics but declined to state that they were constitu-

tionally defective. e Subsequently, the Court has recognized that although multi-member districts may meet the equal population
standard of "one person-one vote" there may be significant

problems regarding the quality of representation afforded residents

of these districts in comparison with residents of single-member
districts. 7 Despite the adverse effects they may have on the quality
of representation,8 the Court has refused to find multi-member districts unconstitutional per se.9

The constitutional standard by which the Court evaluates

Union." Id.
5. In general, a multi-member district is one in which the resident voters
elect at-large more than one representative from the entire district. There are no
wards or subdivisions within the district entitled to proportional representation.
For a defintion of a multi-member legislative district see Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 at 686 n.2 (1964).
6. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of the State of Colorado, 377
U.S. 713, 731 and n.21 (1964), decided with Reynolds v. Sims.
7. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 at 142 (1971). See also TRIBE, supra
note 3, § 13-8 for a cogent analysis of the multi-member district problem. Other
sources treating multi-member district issues: J. Hull, Challenges to At-large
Election Plans: Modern Local Government on Trial, 47 U. CINN. L. REV. 64
(1978); G. Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial
Scrutiny, THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 1 (1973); Comment, Effective Representation and Multi-member Districts, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1577 (1970); A. Derfner, Racial Discriminationand the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973).
8. The Court has recognized that those adverse effects of multi-member districts include their
'winner-take-all' aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities and...
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community interests as
closely as possible and disenchantment with political parties and elections as devices to settle the policy differences between contending
interests.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 158-59.
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 750-51, also notes problems with bloc voting and the
diminished chances of minority candidates being elected. The Supreme Court has
instructed the district courts that in formulating apportionment plans pursuant
to their equity powers "single-member districts are to be preferred in court-ordered legislative apportionment plans unless the court can articulate a singular
combination of unique factors that justifies a different result." Connor v. Finch,
431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977).

9. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 142.
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multi-member districts, as well as other political schemes affecting

the quality of representation, has remained consistent since the issue was first adjudicated in Fortson v. Dorsey.'0 The standard is
whether the multi-member district creates vote dilution" by
"operat[ing] to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population."' 2 Applying this
standard the Court has reviewed a number of state legislative
schemes utilizing multi-member districts and found only one to be
in violation of the Constitution. 3 Despite the acknowledged rule
regarding vote dilution, there has been a failure to provide clear

standards by which the rule is to be applied.' 4 Specifically absent

have been standards to determine: 1) the federal statutory or constitutional guarantees upon which a claim of multi-member district
vote dilution may be based; 2) which "line-drawing" standard is
required: must the multi-member district be motivated by a discriminatory purpose or will discriminatory effect alone suffice to
demonstrate the creation of a racial or political class of electors
whose votes are diluted; 3) which elements need to be proved and
by whom, in order to meet the required standard.
10. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). The Court upheld a Georgia plan allowing for some
multi-member districts in the state's legislative apportionment scheme. The
Court noted, however, that appellees challenged the multi-member districts as
unconstitutional per se and had failed to raise the issue of whether those districts
operated to dilute their votes.
11. Vote dilution appears to be a broad term used by the Court in defining
situations where either the quantitative or qualitative dimension of effective representation is somehow minimized for one group relative to another. See Reese v.
Dallas Co., 505 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1974) (vote diluton or restriction of access to
the political process).
12. 379 U.S. at 439.
13. Following Fortson, the Court failed to find the challenged multi-member
districts unconstitutional in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (multi-member state senatorial districts used within an interim apportionment plan); Dusch
v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) (city council apportionment where four members
were elected at-large but seven others elected at-large were each required to reside in one of the city's boroughs); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)
(state's legislative apportionment making one county a multi-member district);
Dallas County, Alabama v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477 (1975) (officials elected at-large,
each required to be a resident of a different political subdivision). In White v.
Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the Court did find two multi-member districts in
Dallas and Bexar Counties, Texas, to be in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment because plaintiffs had proved those districts had
operated to dilute the votes of black and Mexican-American residents.
14. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 754-55.
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Mobile v. Bolden" presented the Court with a singular opportunity to resolve these issues, both in the narrow context of multimember political districts and in the broad context of the qualitative dimension of fair and effective representation. For the first

time, the Court was presented with the limiting case of a multi-

member district, an entire city government chosen in an at-large
election."6 The fundamental concern was to determine the necessary elements to prove a case of vote dilution. This note will examine the dissonant opinions of the Mobile Court and attempt to
clarify what are the now applicable standards to prove vote dilution under the fourteenth amendment, fifteenth amendment, and
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2.11
15. U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
16. In Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978), the Court addressed the issue
of whether a new apportionment plan adopted by the city of Dallas, after its atlarge election system was invalidated by the district court, was a "legislative" or
"judicial" plan for purposes of review. The actual merits of the new plan, which
provided for some at-large council members, was not at issue. In Dusch v. Davis,
387 U.S. 112 (1967), the Court held constitutional a city plan allowing some city
council members to be elected at-large. Others, although elected at-large, were
each required to reside in a different political subdivision of the city.
17. For the reader unfamiliar with discrimination analysis, it is important to
understand what portion of that analysis the Court was applying in Mobile v.
Bolden. If it is determined that a classification (or "line-drawing") has been made
such that an identified group similarly situated as other groups is being treated
differently or unequally, the Court will examine the state "decision" that created
that classification with some level of judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the Court does
not scrutinize the constitutionality of the state decision unless the plaintiff can
first prove that the decision created a classification based on some characteristic
of the plaintiff (e.g., his race) or on his ability to exercise a constitutional right
(e.g., freedom of speech). Proof of such a classification can be shown in three
ways: (1) when the statute on its face creates a classification, (2) when a "facially
neutral" statute is applied differently to similar groups, and (3) when a "neutral"
statute has the purpose of creating a classification. The latter situation was the
issue in Mobile v. Bolden. There, the plaintiff had to prove that the purpose of
Mobile's commission form of government was to create a class of voters (i.e.,
blacks) whose voting strength would be diluted. The continuing debate in the
Court concerns the term "purpose" and what evidence can prove its existence.
Various Justices have argued for a strict standard (subjective intent of the decision makers to discriminate), a moderate standard (intent of the decisionmakers
but allowing circumstantial evidence to prove that intent), and a liberal standard
(the actual impact or effect of the decision, i.e., does the simple result of the decision's implementation create unequal treatment). For a review of this subject, see
NOWAK, ROTUNDA, AND YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 527-35 (1978).
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ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

Mobile, Alabama, is governed by a City Commission of three
members jointly exercising all legislative, executive, and administrative power. Each commissioner must be elected from the city at
large by a majority of the total vote. 18

Appellees, Bolden and a number of black Mobile residents,
brought a class action suit in a federal district court on behalf of
all black citizens of Mobile. 1' The complaint alleged that Mobile's
at-large electoral system unfairly diluted the voting strength of
blacks in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,20
of the fourteenth amendment,"1 and of the fifteenth amendment.22
Appellants contended that Mobile's City Commission was instituted to provide a more effective business-like government. The atlarge elections assured a city-wide perspective and representation
by the commissioners.' 3
Following a bench trial, the district court found that Mobile's
electoral system operated to discriminate against blacks in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.2' The court ordered the City Commission to be disestablished and replaced by a
Mayor and City Council with council members to be elected from
18. Prior to 1911, Mobile was required to govern itself through a mayor and

city council. ALA. CODE §§ 11-43 (1975). In that year, the Alabama Legislature

authorized large municipalities to adopt a commission form of government. Act
281, 1911 Ala. Acts, at 330. Mobile immediately established its City Commission
that year and has retained it ever since. 1965 Ala. Acts 823, at 1539, § 2, outlines
the specific administrative tasks to be performed by each commissioner and provides that the title of mayor be rotated among the three of them. Mobile's current
governmental structure is a unitary multi-member district in that all commissioners are elected at-large and need not reside in or be elected from any specific
political or other subdivision of the city.
19. Approximately 35% of the residents of Mobile are black. 100 S. Ct. at
1495 n.1.
20. 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). Section 2 provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States on
account of race or color.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 provides in part: "No State shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1 provides: "The right of the citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
23. Brief for appellant, Mobile v. Bolden,

-

U.S.

-,

100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).

24. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
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districts. The court of appeals affirmed the
single-member
25
judgment.
The Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision reversed the judgment
and remanded the case to the court of appeals.26 The four-man
plurality217 held that Mobile's at-large system of municipal elections was not in violation of the Constitution or the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 because there was no proof that the at-large system
was purposefully designed or operated to discriminate against the
black voters of Mobile.26
The plurality first disposed of the appellees' claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Assuming a private right
of action exists29 and relying on the language of the statute 0 and
its legislative history, Justice Stewart concluded that Section 2
"was intended to have an effect no different than that of the
fifteenth amendment itself."' As a result, this statutory provision
added nothing to appellees' fifteenth amendment claim and was
not considered further. In regard to the other opinions, only Justice Marshall addressed the Voting Rights Act issue. He agreed
with the plurality that Section 2 contained the same standard as
25. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978).
U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
26. 27. Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger joined with
Justice Stewart.
28. Justice Stevens concurred with the result but disagreed with the Court's
reasoning. Although he believed that a discriminatory purpose had been demonstrated, Justice Blackmun concurred with the judgment on the grounds that the
district court's remedy was not commensurate with sound judicial discretion. Justice White dissented, finding that an inference of discriminatory purpose had
been sufficiently shown to find a violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that proof of discriminatory impact is
sufficient to prove a vote dilution claim under the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment and such proof was shown here. Alternatively, he also agreed with Justice
White. Justice Brennan stated that he agreed with Justice Marshall's discriminatory impact standard and alternatively with Justice White's analysis.
U.S. at -, 100 S.Ct. at 1496 n.8. In Allen v. State Board of Elec29. tions, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Court recognized the right of a private party to
seek declaratory relief and obtain injunctions against enforcement of state legislation in violation of the Voting Rights Act. The Court, however, also noted cases
where other statutes were found not to confer a private right of action. Although
some lower courts have allowed private suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970), see,
e.g., Gray v. Main, 291 F. Supp. 998 (D.C. Ala. 1966) and Williams v. Sclafani, 444
F. Supp. 895 (D.C.N.Y. 1977), it would appear that the Court is reserving judgment on this issue.
30. See note 20 supra.
31. U.S. at -, 100 S.Ct. at 1496.
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the fifteenth amendment but disagreed with the plurality's construction of that amendment.32
The fifteenth amendment claim presented a more difficult
challenge. The plurality began by characterizing the amendment as
imposing only one limitation on the states: "It forbids them to discriminate against Negroes in matters having to do with voting.""
The right created is not one of suffrage but simply of voting free
from discrimination.34 The phrase "to vote" was construed literally
by the plurality to mean that fifteenth amendment protection extends only to those election practices that directly affect access to
the ballot, i.e., registering and voting.3 6 This narrow characterization was strongly rebutted by the other members of the Court."
Those Justices interpreted the fifteenth amendment as guaranteeing protection against discriminatory vote dilution as well as discriminatory practices affecting ballot box access."
32. U.S. at -, Id. at 1520 n.2.
33. U.S. at -, Id. at 1497.
34. Id., citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 at 217-18 (1875).
35. Although the right to vote is not absolute in that states are allowed to
place reasonable restrictions on exercise of the franchise (e.g., age and residency
restrictions), there is evidence that the fifteenth amendment protects more than
direct access to the ballot. See note 37 infra. The plurality did not expressly state
that direct access to the ballot is the only interest protected by the fifteenth
amendment, but the conclusion is inescapable. Having stated that the amendment prohibits discriminatory denial of the freedom to vote and having recognized the appellees' claim that their voting strength is diluted, the plurality then
concluded that the appellees had no claim under the amendment because they
register and vote without hinderance. Furthermore, the plurality cited no authority to support their conclusion that either the fifteenth amendment protects only
direct access to the ballot or that it does not prohibit vote dilution.
36. Justice Stevens concurring, Justices Marshall and White dissenting, and
Justices Brennan and Blackmun by implication because of their agreement with
Justice White's analysis. See note 28, supra.
37. Justice Stevens argued that the fifteenth amendment is not limited to a
direct ballot access interest. His conclusion was based on Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960). In that case, black voters were gerrymandered out of the
Tuskegee city limits but still had access to the ballot in their new political district. Nevertheless, the Court struck the ordinance down relying on the fifteenth
amendment. Justice White also used Gomillion as an example of the fifteenth
amendment extending its protection to the value of a vote. Additionally, he cited
the fifteenth amendment case of Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), where a
"white primary" system was struck down even though blacks still had a right to
vote in the actual election. Justice Marshall, interpreting the fifteenth amendment term "abridged" to mean a diminution of the value of a vote, also agreed
that the amendment protects against discriminatory vote dilution. He supported
his conclusion on Terry v. Adams and also on the dilution effect of ballot box
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After narrowing the scope of the fifteenth amendment, the
plurality proceeded to find that state action, racially neutral on its

face, can be violative of that amendment only if it was motivated
by the discriminatory purpose to deny or abridge the right to

vote.8 8 Interpreting prior cases and citing specific language contained therein, the plurality concluded that discriminatory purpose

had always been a prerequisite to proving a claim of unconstitutionality in fifteenth amendment cases.89 The plurality then found
that there was no need to apply the purpose standard because the
protections of the fifteenth amendment had not been invaded; the
district court having found that blacks in Mobile "register and
'
' 40
vote without hinderance.

The need for the plurality to even consider formulating a standard of review for a fifteenth amendment discrimination claim
when they had already concluded that the amendment was inapplicable to the present case was questioned by Justice Stevens in
his concurrence.4 1 In Justice Stevens' opinion, the appellees' chal-

lenge to Mobile's electoral system as "adversely affecting the political strength of a racially identifiable group"4 was properly
brought under the amendment because he interpreted it to protect
48
the quality of representation as well as direct access to the ballot.

For Justice Stevens, the proper standard of review was supplied in

Gomillion v. Lightfoot44 which required the appellees to prove that

Mobile's electoral system was "a sufficiently 'uncouth' or irrational
racial gerrymander."4 5 The test to prove "uncouth" would not be
stuffing. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
38.

-

U.S. at

40.
41.
42.

-

- U.S. at
U.S. at
U.S. at

45.

-

U.S. at

100 S. Ct. at 1497.

-,

39. The plurality might have reasoned that discriminatory purpose would
now be the appropriate standard for fifteenth amendment discrimination cases
for purely symmetrical reasons, i.e., to parallel the fourteenth amendment discriminatory purpose test articulated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Instead they chose to interpret prior cases as having required the purpose standard. For each case the plurality relied on, Justice Marshall offered an equally
plausible interpretation that purpose was not necessarily the standard.
-,

,

100 S.Ct. at 1499.
I' at 1509 n.3.
ld.
ld. at 1509.

43. See note 37 supra.
44. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
-,

100 S. Ct. at 1510. Justice Stevens took a broad view of

gerrymandering, defining it as, "drawing district boundaries (or using multimember or at-large elections) in order to maximize the voting strength of those loyal to
the dominant political faction and to minimize the strength of those opposed to
it." Id. at 1510. Justice Stevens viewed his standard as applying to all forms of
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the subjective intent of the decisionmaker but the objective effects
of the political decision. Applying his test to the lower court's findings of fact, Justice Stevens concluded that Mobile's commission
form of government was permissible even though it might have
been the product of some invidious discrimination."
In his dissent, Justice White considered the standard applicable to fifteenth amendment vote dilution cases to be identical with
the Court's current fourteenth amendment equal protection standard of purposeful discrimination. That standard, he argued, could
be proved by circumstantial evidence sufficient to allow an inference of such purpose to be made by the Court. 7 Justice Marshall,
in his dissent, would require only a showing of discriminatory effect as a sufficient fifteenth amendment standard to prove that a
fundamental right to vote had been burdened."
political gerrymandering, not just racial gerrymandering.
46. U.S. at -,
d. at 1514. Justice Stevens' objective test for proving a
fifteenth amendment violation would require a showing that the geographical configuration of the district was not the product of a routine or traditional political
decision, the adverse impact on the minority group was significant, and the decision was unsupported by any neutral justification and thus was either totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the
minority. This test looks suspiciously like a minimal rational basis test in which
the Court upholds a state decision if it is grounded on any legitimate and rational
state interest. Justice Stevens would allow minorities to prove an adverse effect
on their political representation with evidence of its actual impact. But unless the
decision was "totally irrational" or "entirely motivated" by a discriminatory purpose, the political decision would stand even if it was the product of some invidious discrimination by the decisionmakers. Id. at 1512. Alternatively, Justice Stevens' test could be characterized as a balancing test in which the interests of the
political decisionmakers are weighed against the interests of the minority group
with the scales tipped in the legislature's favor. It is noteworthy that Justice Stevens cites Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr with approval. See note 4
supra.
47. Justice White's analysis is presented infra.
48. Characterizing prior analysis of the constitutionality of multi-member
district legislation as inconsistent in resolving the effects-purpose test issue, Justice Marshall interpreted the plurality's case authority as showing that purpose
was not the settled test for vote dilution cases. U.S. at -,
100 S.Ct. at 152224. He then argued that a new and clearer standard was needed for a vote dilution
analysis. He believed that the purpose test was appropriate for a fourteenth
amendment analysis involving suspect classes because there the benefits possibly
distributed unequally are not constitutional entitlements. Allowing impact alone
to prove discrimination would unduly interfere with government distribution of
those benefits, he argued. In his view, however, the fifteenth amendment explicitly recognizes the right to vote free of discrimination and that right is so fundamental that proof of discriminatory impact alone should be sufficient to support a
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When the plurality addressed the claim of vote dilution as a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, they clearly recognized that multi-member districts tend to
adversely affect the qualitative rather than quantitative aspects of
political representation. 4' Justice Stewart, however, chose to frame
the multi-member district issue as one of -racial discrimination
rather than as an infringement of a fundamental right to vote.5 To
recognize the qualitative guarantee of effective representation as a
fundamental right, in Justice Stewart's view, would be equivalent
to creating a right of proportional representation." Justice Stewart
stated that the Court's province was not to "create substantive
claim under the amendment. If severe impact could be shown, the burden of proof
should then shift to the defendants to justify their decision. - U.S. at -, Id. at
1535-37.
49.
50.

-

U.S. at
U.S. at

-'
-,

Id. at 1499.
Id. at 1504. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argued for

the existence of a fundamental right to effective participation in the political process. He relied on case law explicitly finding a fundamental political right to vote:
"[T]he political franchise of voting ...

is a fundamental political right, because

preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1866); "[T]he
right of suffrage is a fundamental matter." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964). But, Justice Marshall's argument necessarily implies a definition of the
"right to vote" broad enough to encompass the qualitative dimension of effective
political participation. Once a fundamental interest is shown to be at stake, under
the current equal protection analysis, one would need to show that it was burdened in some fashion such that some group could not exercise the right as freely
as others, irrespective of the group's characteristics. That burden could be shown
by the mere impact on the fundamental right by a state decision. See e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to privacy). Consequently, less proof is required to establish a linedrawing and judicial scrutiny of the merits of the state decision is more easily
reached. By characterizing the issue as one of racial discrimination, the plurality
places a more stringent burden of proof on the plaintiff by requiring him to establish that a state decision was purposefully made to create a classification drawn
on racial lines. See note 17 supra. Also, the framing of the issue in racial discrimination terms appears to be consistent with the plurality's narrow characterization
of the meaning of the "right to vote" under the fifteenth amendment. See note 35
supra. Had they not put such a gloss on that amendment, it would have been
difficult for the plurality to avoid the logical conclusion that the qualitative dimension of the elective franchise is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore a fundamental interest analysis ought to be applied in
Mobile.
51. Justice Stewart reasoned that recognizing a right of qualitative equal representation, as characterized by Justice Marshall, would mean granting a minority
group the right to have its candidates elected in proportion to its numbers.
U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1504. For further elaboration see note 53 infra.
-
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constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws." 2 It is only the right to vote within the confines of the
"one person-one vote" rule that is constitutionally protected as a

fundamental interest."
Having framed the issue in racial discrimination terms, the
plurality then stated that although multi-member districts are not
unconstitutional per se, they will be in violation of the fourteenth
amendment if their purpose is to minimize or cancel out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic groups. Citing the line of cases addressing the multi-member district issue, Justice Stewart concluded that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the multimember district was "conceived or operated as a purposeful device
to further racial discrimination"." Justice Stewart argued that
claims of racial discrimination affecting voting rights require the
same proof of intent or purpose as other claims of racial discrimination.55 Furthermore, he concluded, prior vote dilution cases
brought under the fourteenth amendment had always required
proof of purposeful discrimination.5 6 Relying on his fundamental
52.

-

case." 54.

-

U.S. at

-,

Id. at 1504.

53. Justice Stewart did agree that the equal protection clause does confer a
substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other voters.
Once the franchise is extended to voters, the Constitution guarantees each voter a
right to have his vote weighted equally with those of other voters. Id. at 1505-06,
citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 576. Justice Stewart, however, viewed the
fundamental right articulated in Reynolds in a narrow context. Equal representation, he reasoned, is a protected interest only to the extent that the right is not
impaired by malapportionment on a population basis. Thus, it appears that he
recognized only the quantitative dimension of "one person-one vote" as a constitutionally guaranteed "fundamental interest", finding in Mobile that "nobody's
vote has been 'diluted' in the sense in which that word was used in the Reynolds
U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1506.
U.S. at -, Id. at 1499 (Justice Stewart quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis,

403 U.S. 124, 149).
55. - U.S. at -, Id. at 1500, citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning excluding low income
housing) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (police officer qualifying
exams). Those cases were the first to explicitly articulate the discriminatory purpose standard and its burden of proof.
56. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1499-1501. Justice Stewart again returned to
the language of the prior multi-member district cases to demonstrate that purposeful discrimination had been a required element of proof. The language of
those cases is ambiguous at best. For example, "designedly or otherwise ... to
minimize ... voting strength. . .", Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. at 439; "plan was
conceived or operated . . .", Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149. The problem

with the prior cases is that no standard had been clearly articulated (see TRiBE,
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interest analysis, Justice Marshall argued that the vote dilution
cases had required only a showing of discriminatory impact or effect to trigger strict judicial scrutiny.5" Justice Stewart, however,
explicitly rejected the "effects test" finding it appropriate only as a
starting point in a line-drawing analysis."
Having reached the essence of the dispute in this case, the
plurality addressed the findings of the district court to determine
if Mobile's electoral system was purposefully designed or operated
to further racial discrimination. Justice Stewart began by finding
that the district court had assessed the appellees' claim by relying
on criteria outlined in Zimmer v. McKeithen.59 But in doing so,
Justice Stewart reasoned, the district court had applied an incorrect standard because Zimmer had incorrectly premised its evidentiary criteria on a standard of discriminatory effect as being sufficient to prove a vote dilution claim. 0° Justice Stewart then
identified each of the facts on which the district court in Mobile
had based its decision. Those facts were that no black had ever
been elected to Mobile's City Commission, that the city had not
been as responsive to the interests of blacks as to those of whites,
that there existed a substantial history of racial discrimination in
Alabama, and that the at-large system per se tended to disadvansupra note 3, at 754). Nevertheless, the plurality was still able to extract a purpose standard and thereby create symmetry with the Court's decisions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights.

57. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1529. Justice Marshall also capitalized on the
ambiguity of the prior cases with respect to the purpose or impact standard. Id. at
1522-24.
58.

-

U.S. at

-,

Id. at 1501. Justice Stewart relied on the reasoning in

Arlington Heights that evidence of impact can trigger a "sensitive inquiry" into
other evidence that might show discriminatory purpose. 429 U.S. at 266.
59. 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973). Those criteria are essentially the
same as Justice White described in his dissent. See note 67 infra.
60.
- U.S. at -, 100 S.Ct. at 1502. The Mobile district court appears to
have been the victim of its own reasoning process. By specifically stating that the
Washington v. Davis purpose standard did not apply to vote dilution cases and
that relief would be granted on a showing of lack of access to the political process,
the district court implicitly recognized discriminatory effect as a standard sufficient to prove a line-drawing. The aggregate of Zimmer factors the court set out
would logically have to be interpreted as evidence of effect. But, the manner in
which the plurality would have judged the district court, had it characterized the
criteria it relied on as the type of indirect and circumstantial evidence sufficient
to prove purposeful discrimination consistent with Washington v. Davis, raises
interesting possibilities.
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tage minorities.6' Applying the discriminatory purpose standard,
Justice Stewart concluded that each factor individually presented
at best circumstantial or tenuous evidence. Even taken together,
the facts were "far from proof that [Mobile's] at-large electoral
scheme represents purposeful discrimination against Negro voters." 62 Justice Stewart failed, however, to articulate exactly what
evidence would demonstrate purposeful discrimination."
Justice White took issue with the plurality's application of the
purposeful discrimination standard to the facts. He relied on the
Court's recognition in Washington v. Davis6" that discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the relevant facts." Furthermore, he argued, the factors relevant to vote dilution cases had
been clearly defined in White v. Register" and reiterated in Zimmer. 7 In Justice White's opinion, the plurality had rejected the
61.
62.

-

U.S. at
U.S. at

,
-,

ld. at 1502.
Id. at 1504. Justice Stewart found that although no black

had ever been elected to the City Commission, blacks register and vote without
hinderance and are not precluded from seeking office. He also noted that only
three blacks had ever run for office in Mobile, all in 1973. Furthermore, the city
commissioners' alleged discrimination against blacks was not relevant in demonstrating the intent of the decisionmakers who established this form of government. The proper focus should be on the state legislature. Past discrimination in
general, said Justice Stewart, cannot condemn present government action unless
there was an intent to discriminate with respect to that present action. In conclusion, Stewart stated that the adverse affects of at-large electoral systems tend to
disadvantage all minorities, not just blacks. Id. at 1503-04.
63. Justice Stewart hinted that although the Zimmer indicia might be some
evidence of discriminatory purpose, these criteria are not per se proof of such
purpose. Id. at 1503. Interestingly, the plurality cited White v. Register favorably
and stated that the evidence shown there was a history of discrimination, indifference to the needs of minorities by elected officials, and exclusion from the slating
process. These factors, the plurality found, showed that White had required proof
of discriminatory purpose. Nevertheless, the plurality appears to have found these
very factors to be insufficient proof of purpose in the present case. See discussion
of Justice White's argument on this point in note 67 infra.
64. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
65. The Court explicitly found that "an invidious discriminatory purpose
may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if
it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another". Id. at 242.
66. 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (two multi-member districts were found unconstitutional). Justice White wrote the majority opinion in White.
67. Justice White apparently looked beyond the words of the district court,
see note 60 supra, to find its analysis consistent with White v. Register and
Washington v. Davis. Accepting a showing of discriminatory purpose as the standard to prove line-drawing, Justice White characterized the factors used by the
district court as indirect and circumstantial evidence of the type recognized in
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inference of purposeful discrimination from the totality of the circumstances test by viewing each factor in isolation. 8
Despite the fragmented disposition of the Mobile case, there is
apparent agreement among the Justices on specific issues with respect to a claim of vote dilution resulting from multi-member dis-

tricting. The standard of review for these cases, clearly accepted by
the entire Court, is whether the districting practices unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or

political elements of the population." This standard represents a
reaffirmation by the Court that it will protect those qualitative

dimensions of the elective franchise.

In addition, there is agreement that a vote dilution claim can

be brought under the fourteenth amendment. Four Justices would
exclude vote dilution claims from fifteenth amendment protection

because they characterize that amendment as protecting only direct access to the ballot box. 70 The remainder of the Court would
allow a claim under the fifteenth amendment because they recognize the amendment's protection as extending to meaningful participation in the political process. 7 ' Regardess of the amendment
under which a claim of vote dilution is brought, a clear majority of
the Court now requires a showing by the plaintiff that purposeful
discrimination was the motivating factor behind the practices re-

would allow discriminatory
sulting in vote dilution.7 ' Two Justices
78
effect as the standard of proof.

Washington v. Davis and permissible to establish proof sufficient to create an inference of discriminatory purpose. Those factors were "a lack of minority access
to the candidate selection process, unresponsiveness of elected officials to minority interests, a history of discrimination, majority vote requirements, provisions
that candidates run for positions by place or number, and the lack of any provision for at-large candidates to run from particular geographical subdistricts."
-

U.S. at

-,

100 S. Ct. at 1516.

U.S. at -, Id. at 1518-19. Justice White's conclusion may be correct.
68.
It is possible, however, to conclude that the plurality simply found the facts insufficient to support even an inference of discriminatory purpose.
-

69.

-

U.S. at

-,

100 S. Ct. at 1499.

70. See note 35 supra.
71. See note 37 supra.
72. Those Justices include the plurality, Justice White and, by implication,
Justice Blackmun because he agreed with Justice White's analysis. Justice Stevens, although not ascribing to a purpose test, would require a showing of something more rigorous than impact.
73. Justice Marshall would allow the effects standard because he characterizes vote dilution as an infringement of a fundamental right. But if forced to apply a discrimination analysis, he would agree to the purpose standard. Justice
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Mobile failed to resolve the crucial issue of what evidence is
sufficient to prove purposeful discrimination for vote dilution
claims. This issue is one that has continued to plague the Court in
all its modern discrimination cases. 74 Four Justices would require a
showing of intent to discriminate on the part of the decisionmakers
who implemented the contested vote dilution practice. They failed,
however, to clarify what type of evidence would suffice to demonstrate that intent.75 Four Justices would allow an inference of discriminatory purpose to be made from the "totality of the circumstances" if the plaintiff could demonstrate some direct or
circumstantial evidence of the existence of specific factors relevant
to vote dilution. 8 Justice Stevens would require a different standard of proof that looks suspiciously like a minimal rational basis
analysis."
Ultimately, one may legitimately conclude that the Court in
Mobile has clearly established a new standard of review for vote
dilution claims. For a claim of vote dilution brought under the
fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the plaintiff must now prove
that a state decision was made for the discriminatory purpose of
"drawing a line" in order to impair the effective representation of
an identifiable group. The discriminatory purpose could be inferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence, though it is not
78
clear what specific evidence would be acceptable to the Court.
THE FUTURE OF VOTE DILUTION CASES

Mobile v. Bolden has defined new standards by which to review challenges to multi-member districts and other claims of vote
dilution. Clearly the qualitative dimension of effective representation is not viewed by the Court as a "fundamental interest" proBrennan agreed with Justice Marshall. See note 48 supra.
74. See e.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, at 1028-32; Comment, Proof of Racially
DiscriminatoryPurpose under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARVARD CIVIL
RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 725 (1977).
75. See note 63 supra.
76. Justice White argued for this analysis and Justice Blackmun agreed with
him. Justices Marshall and Brennan agreed with Justice White in the alternative.
See note 67 supra.
77. See note 46 supra.
78. This interpretation of Mobile would seem to follow in light of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. The plurality did not overrule the "proof by
inference test" suggested by these cases and by implication would still support
that test.
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tected by the fourteenth amendment.7 9 The interest is protected
only if a state decision is made which purposefully allocates this
interest on an unequal basis with respect to the characteristics of
an identifiable group of people. Thus, a more rigorous proof of
line-drawing is imposed upon the plaintiff." By defining vote dilution in discrimination terms, the Court is continuing its current
trend to avoid creating new constitutional rights for purposes of
fourteenth amendment protection.
The Court, having discovered a new standard in old decisions,
now requires a showing of purposeful discrimination in vote dilution cases. The Court, however, continues to search for an appropriate standard by which to prove such purpose. Because most legislation is supported by some valid state interest and the
subjective intent of the decisionmakers is impossible to demonstrate, it would seem that some form of indirect evidence will have
to be allowed to prove that the purpose of contested legislation was
discriminatory. Indeed, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.81 appeared to have resolved much of the
problem with its test allowing indirect and circumstantial evidence
to prove that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in a
state decision. 2 Arguably that test is still viable if the plurality can
be viewed as having applied it but found the facts insufficient to
allow an inference of purposeful discrimination.
The real-life ramifications of an opposite result in Mobile may
have had a compelling influence on the Court's decision.6 8 The
79. The Court does recognize, however, that the quantitative dimension of
effective representation, i.e., "one person-one vote", is a fundamental interest. See
note 53 supra.
80. If the qualitative dimension is to be cast on the suspect classification side
of equal protection analysis then it would seem logical to place a stringent burden
on the plaintiffs to demonstrate that a line had been drawn with respect to the
group's characteristics. For example, where a line has been drawn on the basis of
race and the "strict scrutiny" standard is invoked, the state decision at issue virtually never prevails. The Court then has created the "purpose" test to prevent
an otherwise lawful state decision from being invalidated because the mere impact of the decision has the effect of unequal treatment for the racial group. This
would seem sensible because any state decision could be shown to affect some
groups of people more than others.
81. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
82. Id. at 266-68 and 270-71 n.21.
83. Justice Blackmun's pragmatic concurrence illustrates this consideration.
The district court had ordered the city of Mobile to disestablish its City Commission and institute a mayor-city council form of government employing single
member districts for the election of council members. 432 F. Supp. at 404. Al-
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commission form of city government which Mobile employed, with4
its at-large electoral system, is pervasive throughout the nation.1
To find such a system unconstitutional would have profound social
and political implications.8 s Yet, in Mobile's municipal system all
legislative, administative, and executive power is vested in the atlarge elected commissioners. This differs from allowing some at86
large districts in an essentially single-districted state legislature.
In that legislative situation, it could be argued that minority
groups at least have an opportunity to be represented by some of
the single-member districts. Therefore, they would have a voice in
and have some impact on the political system, including the districting plan.8 7 At-large elections in the municipal system, on the
other hand, may create true "insular minorities." The minority
groups theoretically could never become elected or achieve a majority, thereby altering the system through political participation.
The plurality in Mobile apparently disagrees and would give
greater weight to the positive aspects of the at-large electoral system in municipal government. A plaintiff would have a heavy burden to overcome if, indeed, the Court is not only giving the presumption of constitutionality to the city but also recognizing a
though Justice Blackmun agreed with the district court that Mobile's at-large
electoral system was purposefully discriminatory, he sided with the plurality's decision to reverse. In his opinion, any alteration of a long-established form of municipal government is a drastic measure for a court to take and the alteration
imposed by the district court exceeded the scope of the violation. In Justice
Blackmun's view, the case should be remanded for the district court to fashion an
alternative remedy that would allow Mobile to retain some positive elements of
its commission system. One such plan, he suggested, might mandate more commissioners, some of whom would be elected from single-member districts. - U.S.
at

-,

84.

100 S. Ct. at 1507-8.
U.S. at -, Id. at 1496 n.7.
-

85. This appeared to create concern for many of the Justices. Perhaps the
prospect of "opening the floodgates" and having at-large city electoral systems
challenged across the nation was too alarming to warrant a finding of unconstitutionality in Mobile. See the plurality's view, Id. at 1496 and 1507; Justice Blackmun's view, Id. at 1508; Justice Stevens' view, Id. at 1513-14.
86. The plurality assumed for present purposes that the at-large election of
all city officials vested with legislative, executive, and administrative powers was
constitutionally indistinguishable from a state legislative scheme employing only a
few multi-member districts. They also recognized that this might be a rash assumption. Id. at 1501-2.
87. The minoritites may not be able to cast decisive ballots but at least they
will have a voice in the very political body that creates policy, thus gaining some
influence. See TaIE, supra note 3, at 750 n.2.
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unitary multi-member district as a desirable type of municipal
government." This would seem contrary to the Court's distaste for
multi-member districting for state legislatures.8 9
In the final analysis, the future of vote dilution claims and
challenges to multi-member districts in particular appears dim.
The plaintiff can plead his case under the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendment but the constitutional analysis under both will be
identical. If the plaintiff can show that the multi-member districting scheme denies him access to the ballot, excludes him from participating in the primary process, or prevents him from slating candidates or running for office, he will have a good chance of
demonstrating purposeful discrimination. However, evidence of
past discrimination, unequal treatment by elected officials, failure
to win elections, or unequal minority representation in proportion
to numbers will not individually or in the aggregate show proof of
discriminatory purpose.9 Perhaps Justice Stevens best articulated
the Court's future treatment for multi-member districts when he
stated, "we must accept the choice to retain Mobile's commission
form of government as constitutionally permissible even though
that choice may well be the product of mixed motivation, some of
which is invidious."
CONCLUSION

Mobile v. Bolden established a new standard of review for vote
dilution cases involving multi-member districting. Under either the
88. In a technical application of equal protection analysis, the interests of the
city would not be assessed until the Court reached the point of requiring the city
to show a compelling interest in maintaining its electoral system. Such court
"scrutiny" would only occur if a plaintiff first proved discriminatory purpose, an
analysis theoretically devoted only to demonstrating that a classification had been
created. See note 17 supra. Nevertheless, a pure separation of analytic components is illusory. The Court is invariably going to weigh the plaintiffs' arguments
in establishing a line-drawing in light of the interests of the city in having at-large
elections.
89. See note 8 supra.
90. In short, challenges to multi-member districts are going to fail unless
there is proof of an abridgment of those rights directly related to the rule of "one
person-one vote" or those rights associated with direct political participation (e.g.,
voting, running for office). It would also seem probable that White v. Register will
be distinguished from most future multi-member district challenges because the
minorities there were denied access to the process of slating candidates, an infringment of a form of direct political participation.
91.

-

U.S. at

-,

100 S. Ct. at 1514.
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fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, a plaintiff must now prove
that a multi-member district was created for the discriminatory
purpose of diluting the voting strength of a racial or political element of the voting population. The Mobile Court failed to concur
on what evidential factors would be sufficient to prove purposeful
discrimination in vote dilution cases. Perhaps the judicial discretion created by the lack of clear standards will find future vote
dilution claims decided on a case by case basis, the result of which
may be dependent on the undisclosed evaluation of the Justices.
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